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TH AL LAW JO RAL
DANIEL RICHMAN
Federal Sentencing in 2007:
The Supreme Court Holds - The Center Doesn't
A B ST R ACT. This essay takes stock of federal sentencing after 2007, the year of the periphery.
On Capitol Hill, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales resigned in the face of widespread criticism
over his role in the replacement of several U.S. Attorneys. In the Supreme Court, the trio of Rita
v. United States, Gall v. United States, and Kimbrough v. United States clarified and perhaps
extended the breadth of license given to district judges in an advisory guideline regime. In
contrast to the Supreme Court's sentencing cases, which focus on the allocation of authority
between judges and juries, and the bulk of the sentencing literature, which pits prosecutors
against judges, the institutional pairing highlighted here is Main Justice versus the districts, with
Department of Justice (DOJ) sentencing policies since 2001 considered in the larger context of
DOJ efforts to exercise power over U.S. Attorneys' offices. What has often been framed as
"judicial discretion" might better be seen as a coordinated exercise in local norm setting- an
exercise in which line prosecutors, through charging power and shared control over investments
in information gathering (in tandem with agencies) inevitably play a critical role. The extent to
which prosecutors will be allowed to explicitly embrace the power they tacitly exercise already,
and whether an illusory regime of sentencing uniformity will give way to a real one of
collaborative norm articulation and development, remains to be seen. But the suggestion here is
that the new sentencing cases may point the way to a healthier federal criminal justice system.
A U T H 0 R. Professor, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Alexandra Bowie, Madhu
Chugh, Jerry Lynch, Gillian Metzger, Kate Stith, and Steve Thel for extremely helpful comments
on prior drafts, and especially to Bill Stuntz for an enormously rewarding (and humbling)
intellectual exchange that I hope will continue for a great many years.
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INTRODUCTION
Last year will go down in the chronicles of federal criminal law as the year
of the periphery. On Capitol Hill, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales,
dispatched from the White House to preside over the Department of Justice
(DOJ), discovered to his chagrin that U.S. Attorneys can bite back-at least
when Congress wants them to. After he resigned in the face of widespread
legislative and public criticism over his role in the replacement of several U.S.
Attorneys (among other things), his post was filled by Michael B. Mukasey, a
Washington outsider with deep roots in the Southern District of New York.' In
the Supreme Court, the trio of Rita v. United States,2 Gall v. United States,3 and
Kimbrough v. United States4 enshrined the reasonable district court as the
ineffable place where federal criminal policy, sentencing philosophy, and
individualized judgment merge. To be sure, a close reader might consider the
trilogy simply an announcement that the Court meant what it said back in 2005
when, relying on the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, it declared the
hitherto mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory in United
States v. Booker.' But reiteration befitted Booker, since the message of its two
different majority opinions had yet to be fully assimilated by the Justice
Department or the appellate law of many circuits. Now the discretionary
license given to district courts across the country would be written in larger
print. In a world with vanishingly few trials, the ultimate decentralized actor -
the jury-in whose name this line of cases started, has pretty much dropped
out of the picture except in Justice David Souter's Gall concurrence.6 The year
thus presented a stark contrast between the toppling of the most centralized
actor and the celebration of nearly the least.
It is too early to predict precisely how the trio of cases will play out, or what
the dynamic between Justice Department headquarters (the amalgam of
political leadership and central bureaucracy often referred to as "Main
1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Philip Shenon, Bush To Appoint Ex-Judge as Head ofJustice Dept., N.Y.
TimEs, Sept. 17, 2007, at 1.
2. 127 S. Ct. 24S6 (2007).
3. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
4- 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
5. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
6. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he best resolution of the tension
between substantial consistency throughout the system and the right of jury trial" would be
a scheme of mandatory guidelines that required "jury findings of all facts necessary to set
the upper range of sentencing discretion.").
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Justice"7) and the U.S. Attorneys' offices in the far-flung districts will be under
Attorney General Mukasey or the next Administration. But it is the perfect time
to think about the potential implications for the interaction of sentencing
policy and the federal enforcement system.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's sentencing cases, which at least until
recently focused on the allocation of authority between judges and juries, and
the bulk of the sentencing literature, which pits prosecutors against judges, the
institutional pairing I wish to highlight is Main Justice versus the districts. The
story of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ought to be seen not just as an
exercise in branch checking-of judges by the legislature, with help from
prosecutors-but rather as part of a hierarchical project on the executive side
whose contours and consequences were barely dreamed about at the outset.
This project did not necessarily have to become intertwined with federal
sentencing doctrine and practice. One could imagine a sentencing regulatory
regime that gave free rein to prosecutorial discretion and focused only on
judges. One could also imagine exertions of authority by the executive center
that would not be expressed in sentencing policies. But intertwine the projects
indeed did, and we are working through the fallout from their entanglement.
One goal of this essay is to place the Justice Department's recent sentencing
policies within the larger context of the Department's efforts to control U.S.
Attorneys' offices. A second goal, both normative and diagnostic, is to show the
incoherence of those policies, at least when applied to that large part of the
federal enforcement docket charging offenders normally prosecuted by state
and local authorities. Indeed, the demand for consistency in how federal
prosecutors handled those cases nationwide merely reinforced the most
problematic aspect of the federal enforcement system-an unaccountability
arising out of the insufficient demarcation of its responsibilities. A third goal is
tentatively to celebrate the Supreme Court's recent (re)establishment of
reasonable judicial discretion as the touchstone of federal sentencing law.
One need not have special confidence in the wisdom of sentencing judges
to join this celebration. Appreciation of prosecutorial competencies and
capabilities should be enough. What has often been framed as "judicial
discretion" might better be seen as a coordinate exercise in local norm setting-
an exercise in which line prosecutors, through charging power and shared
control (with agencies) over investments in information gathering, inevitably
play a critical role. Whether prosecutors will be allowed to embrace the power
they tacitly exercise already, and whether an illusory regime of sentencing
7. See, e.g., JIM McGEE & BRIAN DuFFY, MAIN JuSTICE: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE
THE NATION'S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GuARD ITS LIBERTIES (1996).
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uniformity will give way to a real one of collaborative norm articulation and
development, remains to be seen. But the suggestion here is that the new
sentencing cases may point the way to a healthier federal criminal justice
system- one in which prosecution and sentencing decisions become something
more than an abstract exercise in number generation.
Part I limns the Bush Administration's centralization efforts at the Justice
Department. While these efforts initially appeared aimed more at un-
decentralization, their direction was pretty clear even before the U.S. Attorney
firings. Part II explores how the Administration's centralization project
intersected with its sentencing policy, each reinforcing the other, with the
Sentencing Guidelines used as a tool of hierarchical control and the Attorney
General's authority deployed in service of the Guidelines. Part III takes a
normative turn and explains how the Department's sentencing policies, when
promulgated against the backdrop of a federal docket largely anchored in local
concerns, compounded the lack of consistency inherent in the system. Finally,
Part IV explains how the Supreme Court's cases, when coupled with changes in
the Department's political leadership and policies, may open up a new space for
collaborative sentencing lawmaking at the district level.
I. DOJ CENTRALIZATION UNDER BUSH (11)
While the image of the overzealous prosecutor has its place in any doctrinal
or institutional analysis of criminal justice pathologies, the risk of "shirking"
looms as large here as in any other bureaucratic context. Prosecutors, and the
agents or police officers they work with,' decide what cases to pursue; decide
how much evidence to gather; assess the strength of the resulting case file; and
conduct the negotiations that, if successful, will produce a guilty plea obviating
the need for a trial at which their work could be assessed by others. There
might be prosecutors who sometimes hope that negotiations break down and
trials ensue. Trials are rare commodities in the United States, and trial
experience is eminently marketable.9 And there might be occasions in which a
prosecutor prefers that a particular defendant gets a particularly high or low
sentence. But the principal agency risk when it comes to sentencing is that,
having threatened the highest sentence legally possible (or maybe even beyond
8. See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 749 (2003).
9. See Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of
Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. &ECON. 627 (2005).
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that), the prosecutor will treat sentence years as currency to be exchanged for a
higher conviction rate and maybe even personal leisure.1"
This generic analysis extends across all U.S. jurisdictions. Yet the federal
criminal enforcement system has its own special agency problems. The basic
structure and its historical roots are just the beginning of the challenge. The
bulk of federal prosecutions are brought by the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys'
offices, which are generally staffed by local professionals, many of whom will
be leaving government service in the not-too-distant future." These offices -
which predate the Justice Department by nearly a hundred years -are headed
by presidential appointees, who report (on paper at least) only to the Attorney
General and his Deputy. Each appointee at least traditionally has had her own
local power base, having been selected with considerable input from local
political leaders.' 2 Cases come to these offices or are suggested by a wide range
of agencies that include federal enforcement bureaus, whose field offices may
have local ties of their own, and local police departments.'3 And to add to these
institutional design challenges is the very nature of federal criminal
jurisdiction, which-with a few exceptional areas where federal responsibility
for the "crime rate" is somewhat clear-confounds any effort to devise effective
performance measures.
14
How have the federal enforcement bureaucracy's political principals
responded to this degree of "slack" in the system? On the legislative side, the
response over the past few decades has generally been a mix of acquiescence
and self-defensive embrace. Through oversight and targeted funding, Congress
1o. See Manu Raghav, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, Convictions Versus Conviction
Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice 14 (Mar. 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/prosecutors-raghav-ramseyer-rasmusen.pdf (noting how
principals cannot know how many potential cases exist "and so have difficulty evaluating the
number of convictions [a prosecutor] achieves, not to mention the average sentence for
those convictions").
11. See Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States
Attorneys' Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 282-83
(2002).
12. See JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL
AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 35-53 (1978); H.W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys - Whom Shall They
Serve?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 129, 138-39; Daniel C. Richman, Federal
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757,
789-90 (1999).
13. Richman, supra note 8, at 767-78.
14. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 1O5 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 611-15 (2005).
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regularly tries to shape prosecutorial priorities."s And the disclosures in the
wake of the U.S. Attorney firings highlight the readiness of at least some
legislators to be occasionally quite vocal in demanding zealous pursuit of
certain cases or classes of cases.' 6 But, at least until recently, the dominant
pattern in congressional activity vis-i-vis U.S. Attorneys' offices has been to
nurture their independence and their resistance to central control.
1 7
Efforts by the Chief Executive to exercise such control have varied from
administration to administration. That George W. Bush's Administration
would be committed to increasing the authority of the Attorney General and
his minions in Main Justice over U.S. Attorneys and their assistants was clear
from the start, however, and over-determined. Certainly a relative increase in
centralization was inevitable given the state of the Department at the end of
President Clinton's tenure. That Administration's commitment to presidential
authority, so nicely elucidated by Elena Kagan,' 8 found comparatively little
expression in the federal criminal enforcement area. Indeed, the flip side of the
wide berth that the Clinton White House left Attorney General Janet Reno in
the wake of politically sensitive investigations became her political weakness in
battles with Congress, the FBI, and others.19 One can fairly speculate that this
is. Richman, supra note 12, at 789-81o (describing the procedural and structural mechanisms
through which Congress influences federal enforcement decision making). For a recent
funding example, consider the Effective Corruption Prosecutions Act of 2007, S. 118, 11oth
Cong. (2007), introduced in the first days of the new 1ioth Congress by the new Senate
Judiciary Committee chair, authorizing an annual appropriation of twenty-five million
dollars for four years to "increase the number of personnel to investigate and prosecute
public corruption offenses." Id. § 4.
16. Justice Department documents indicate sustained efforts by Representatives Darrell Issa and
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., to get U.S. Attorney Carol Lam to pursue more "coyote
prosecutions." E-mail from Carol Lam, U.S. Att'y, S.D. Cal., to Rebecca Seidel, Dep. Ass't
Att'y Gen. (Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Printshop.aspx?Section
=411 (DOJ document set six). Hearing testimony suggests that Senator Pete Domenici and
Representative Heather Wilson of New Mexico badgered U.S. Attorney David Iglesias
about a pending corruption investigation involving Democrats. See Kenneth Jost, Prosecutors
and Politics: Has the Justice Department Become Too Political?, 17 CQRESEARCHER 555, 558-59
(2007).
17. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 11o HARV. L. REV. 469, 497
(1996); Richman, supra note 12, at 807-10; see also Richard W. Waterman & Kenneth J.
Meier, Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 173, 175
(1998) ("In the institutional model, if a political principal such as the legislature decides that
it is not in its rational self-interest to police or monitor its bureaucratic agents, that principal
is unlikely to directly bear any cost incurred by the agent's continued shirking.").
18. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv.L. REV. 2245 (2001).
19. See Lincoln Caplan, Hyper Hacks: What's Really Wrong with the Bush Justice Department,
SLATE, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.slate.conid/216l8o4/ (noting that the departure of
138o
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lack of political clout affected the Department's authority over the districts.
What is clear, though, is that there were few conspicuous assertions of that
authority.2"
Moreover, the Clinton Justice Department's enforcement priorities
themselves engendered a devolution of power. A federal focus on violent crime
will not always come with a commitment to increased district authority.
Indeed, case-counting from Washington became a hallmark of the
"accountability" measures in Project Safe Neighborhood, the Bush
Administration's national gun violence program.2 However, as federal
enforcement agencies lack the manpower and informational resources to go
after episodic criminal activity, and therefore depend on local police
departments in this regard, the extent of the Reno Justice Department's
commitment to violent crime itself had a centrifugal effect. ' Gun possession
cases, car-jackings, or street drug sales will rarely come to federal agents unless
the local police make the arrests and turn over the defendants. That effect was
magnified by the frankness and enthusiasm with which the Department ceded
control of its "Anti-Violent Crime Initiative" to the districts and celebrated
Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell and "the arrival of the Whitewater scandal
loosened the department's political leash"); David S. Cloud, Polite Prosecutor: The Attorney
General Gets Little Respect; What's Her Problem?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2000, at Ai; Jeffrey
Goldberg, What Is Janet Reno Thinking?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 16;
Diana R Gordon, Can Reno Be the People's Lauryer? Justice Watch, NATION, Mar. 21, 1994, at
370; John F. Harris & David A. Vise, With Freeh, Mistrust Was Mutual, WASH. POST, Jan. lo,
20Ol, at Al; Melinda Henneberger, As Pressure Builds, Reno Appears Calm, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
4, 1999, at A9; David A. Vise & Lorraine Adams, Hatch, Reno, and the "Palace Guard,"
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1999, at A29; David A. Vise & Lorraine Adams, Revelations Inflame
Rift Between Justice Dept. and FBI, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1999, at A3; see also Richman, supra
note 8, at 773 nl.1o.
2o. Two Clinton Administration U.S. Attorneys resigned under fire, one after being videotaped
grabbing a television reporter by the throat and the other "amid accusations that he bit a
topless dancer on the arm during a visit to an adult club after losing a big drug case." KEVIN
M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE SERVED LESS THAN FULL
FOUR-YEAR TERMS, 1981-2OO6, at 6-7 (2007) (quoting Associated Press, U.S. Attorney
Resigns amid Turmoil, TULSA WORLD, May 18, 1996, at A3), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33889-2007O222.pdf.
21. For examples of intense case-counting by the DOJ, see USAO District Review, Project Safe
Neighborhoods 24-28 (Mar. 6, 20o6), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Printshop.aspx
?Section=411 (DOJ document set one).
22. See Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority,
43 ARIz. L. REv. 369, 378 (2001).
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heterogeneous district strategies.23 Indeed, the Reno Justice Department went
further, allowing even international terrorism cases to be primarily run out of
the districts -principally the Southern District of New York. 4
The new management style of the Bush/Ashcroft Justice Department was
not simply a response to the reduced baseline of the prior administration,
however. It also reflected an embrace of unitary executive theory that both
justified and presaged a broad-based effort to subordinate all prosecutorial
decision making to centralized control." And it was of a piece with the Bush
White House's efforts in other areas of executive policy.2
6
Evidence that the Bush Administration would be tightening the reins on
the districts came early, although it was not overwhelming. Following the
precedent set by the Clinton Administration in 1993, though with somewhat
less speed, 7 the Administration asked for the resignations of nearly all the U.S.
Attorneys2 8 The number of replacement appointees with ties closer to the
23. Id. at 378-83; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PROMISING STRATEGIES To REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE (1999), available at
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/gun-violence/173950.pdf.
24. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 71-74 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report /
911ReportCh3.pdf; ANDREW C. MCCARTHY, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: A MEMOIR OF THE JIHAD
(2008).
25. For explorations of the theory and its ramifications, see, for example, Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994);
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 1O5 HARv. L. REv. 1153 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional
Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SuP. CT. REV. 225; and Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief
Prosecutor, 73 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 521 (2005). For critiques of the theory, see Susan Low
Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning
There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal
Law Enforcement: Some Lessonsforom History, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 275 (1989); and Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1994).
26. See Sidney M. Milkis & Jesse H. Rhodes, George W. Bush, the Republican Party, and the
"New"American Party System, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 461, 472 (2007) ("Already executive-centered
in its approach to politics and policy, the Bush White House became even more insulated
from Congress and the Republican Party as it planned and fought the war against
terrorism."); see also Tim Conlan & John Dinan, Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the
Transformation of American Conservativism, 37 PUBLIUS 279, 280 (2007); Stuart Shapiro, An
Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 270 (2007).
27. See David Johnston, Attorney General Seeks Resignations from Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 1993, atAi.
28. See Andy Newman, White House Seeks Resignations of3 Prosecutors in New York, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 20O1, at B3.
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White House than to local power bases was interesting but not remarkable. So
too was the stature of the new Criminal Division head, Michael Chertoff.2 9
The Department's response to Enron's collapse and other financial debacles
made clear that Washington would not always prevail-or at least that
Washington could be persuaded of the virtues of decentralization in some
areas. In July 2002 with great fanfare, President Bush announced the formation
of the Corporate Fraud Task Force. 30 What was most noteworthy about this
"Task Force" was what it was not. Although a team of Assistant U.S. Attorneys
(AUSAs) was brought together under Criminal Division supervision to pursue
the Enron investigations and any prosecutions flowing therefrom, corporate
fraud cases generally would still be handled by U.S. Attorneys' offices in much
the same way as before. More than anything, the Task Force was a branding
device that allowed the Administration to take political credit for the far-flung
activities of the districts without taking on much responsibility or operational
control.
31
However, the creation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force occurred against
the backdrop of 9/11- an extraordinary shock to the federal system and one
that implicated or could be claimed to have implicated national security
concerns in all future interactions between Washington and the districts.2
Terrorism prevention would now be at the top of the Department's priorities
and would exert considerable centripetal force. 3 Even as they recognized the
coordinating role that U.S. Attorneys' offices would have to play in the creation
29. See David Johnston, Bush Chooses Chieffor Federal Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at
A23.
30. See David E. Sanger, Bush, on Wall St., Offers Tough Stance, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at Ai
(reporting that President Bush announced that the Corporate Fraud Task Force would
"function as a financial crimes SWAT team").
31. See David Johnston, The Task Force; Big Names but No Authority To Prosecute, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 10, 2002, at C6 ("[L]aw enforcement officials said that the new unit would have little
effect on how corporate crime is investigated by the F.B.I. and the Justice Department.");
David Voreacos & Bob Van Voris, Bush Fraud Probes Jail Corporate Criminals Less Than Two
Years, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid=2o6ollO3
&sid=awztpgouskEo&refer=us# (recounting that Main Justice officials involved in the
Corporate Task Force recall that they "closely tracked cases, advising on tactics and sending
Justice Department prosecutors from Washington to help U.S. attorneys nationwide").
32. Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME &JUST.
377, 408 (2006).
33. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 618-19; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S
REPRIORITIZATION EFFORTS, AUDIT REPORT 05-37 (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/ao537/final.pdf.
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of a domestic intelligence "network,"34 Justice officials worked hard to run the
operation from the top.
Although there is no clear evidence that the Bush Administration initially
selected U.S. Attorneys with an eye toward centralized control, there is
evidence it started doing so by Bush's second term once Alberto Gonzales
became Attorney General. 3s As for the firings that occurred in late 2006, it is
hard to assess actual causation based on the current state of the evidence. 36 Not
only does there appear to be a different story behind each firing, but some of
the stories, particularly those of Carol Lam in San Diego and David Iglesias in
New Mexico, involved exertions of power by local legislators.37 Nonetheless,
the available evidence does depict a significant level of dissatisfaction on the
part of DOJ apparatchiks with efforts by the fired U.S. Attorneys to exercise
and extend decentralized authority. In Arizona, Paul Charlton had the temerity
to seek reconsideration of the determination that the death penalty be sought
in one of his cases." In Washington State, John McKay annoyed Main Justice
officials by touting a local intelligence-sharing network. 39 And there was some
34. See Richman, supra note 32, at 408.
35. See Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Posts Go to Bush Insiders; Less Preference Shown
for Locals, Senators' Choices, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at Al ("About one-third of the nearly
four dozen U.S. attorney's jobs that have changed hands since President Bush began his
second term have been filled by the White House and the Justice Department with trusted
administration insiders."). But see Andrew Rudalevige & David E. Lewis, Parsing the
Politicized Presidency: Centralization and Politicization as Presidential Strategies for
Bureaucratic Control (Sept. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www
.princeton.edu/-delewis/Papers/rudalevigelewis.pdf (suggesting that centralization and
politicization are substitute, not complementary, strategies).
36. Without the baseline that the e-mail traffic involving retained U.S. Attorneys would
provide, it is hard to tell whether the policy conflicts revealed in the e-mail traffic relating to
the fired U.S. Attorneys were relatively serious or similarly provided post hoc justifications.
Further light doubtlessly will be shed on the firings by any report that emerges out of the
pending joint investigation by the Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General and
Office of Professional Responsibility.
37. Although the legislators involved seem to have given little thought to the matter, efforts by
local politicians to recruit Washington's muscle to serve local political ends may well
undermine the long-term institutional interests of Congress. See Richman, supra note 12, at
8o8 (noting Congress's "appreciation of decentralized authority"); see also DAVID E. LEWIS,
PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 28-29 (2003) (discussing the
congressional calculus with respect to the insulation of agencies from presidential control).
38. See Richard A. Serrano, Listing Reasons for the Firings, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at A18.
39. See Paul Shukovsky, Ex-U.S. Attorney McKay Was Forced To Resign, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 8, 2007, at Bi; see also John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice
Department, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 265, 278-79 (2008); Richman, supra note 32, at 423
(describing program).
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dissatisfaction in Washington with Carol Lam's failure to hit the right number
of immigration cases .
40
One cannot speak in definitively comparative terms because no other recent
Justice Department leadership has suffered the compelled disclosure of so
broad a range of internal communications. Yet it is hard to peruse the hearing
testimony and the documents released in connection with the legislative probes
of the U.S. Attorney firings without getting the overwhelming impression that
what may have begun as a response to Attorney General Reno's policies had,
under Alberto Gonzales, developed into a concerted effort to rein in district
initiative and authority.
II. "UNIFORMITY" IN FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE EXECUTIVE
PERSPECTIVE
Although most critiques of the Bush Administration's sentencing policies
have focused on how they affected the allocation of authority between judges
and prosecutors, the Department's sustained campaign against judicial
sentencing discretion also ought to be seen in the context of the executive
centralization project just described. If Washington were to tame the districts,
it would need a mechanism of control far more pervasive than the replacement
of allegedly recalcitrant political appointees. In this effort, the Bush
Administration found itself a willing partner in Congress, and an alluring tool
in Congress's commitment to the notion of "uniformity" in federal sentencing.
Having given scant thought to which cases within the ever-growing
jurisdiction of federal enforcers ought to be pursued, Congress had nonetheless
decided that it wanted "uniformity" in their handling. Such was the message of
the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984.41 To be sure, the SRA also reflected
the same distrust of judges and their characteristic leniency that inspired the
statutory mandatory minimum provisions that began to proliferate in the late
198os. But there is no reason to doubt Congress's commitment to uniformity-
albeit an extremely thin notion of uniformity, one that made no attempt to
limit executive decisions about which cases to prosecute but simply sought to
ensure that similar defendants so selected would be treated similarly.
40. But see Q& A: Legal Matters with Carol Lam, STAN. LAW., Fall 2007, at 24, 27 (quoting Lam
recalling DOJ satisfaction with her focus on alien smuggling organizations instead of
individual illegal re-entry cases).
41. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (2000); 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2000)).
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As Kate Stith notes, the Sentencing Guidelines and the statutory
mandatory minimum provisions with which they were intertwined certainly
created the potential for a vast transfer of discretionary power from judges to
line prosecutors.42 The new scheme was supposed to constrain prosecutors as
well. Although they would still have the ability either not to bring a case or to
drop it thereafter, the purpose of the modified real offense sentencing approach
of the Guidelines was to limit prosecutorial leverage in plea negotiations by
requiring judges to base a defendant's sentence on all relevant conduct, not just
the subset of it specified by the prosecutor. 4' But this was not to be, as judges
largely abandoned the field to the parties and particularly to prosecutors. Stith
has elsewhere explained:
Probation officers soon learned that it is time-consuming and often
unproductive to attempt to learn "facts" from sources other than the
attorneys in the case, while judges generally had no interest in forcing
the parties to prove or disprove 'facts' that neither party wanted the
sentence to be based upon.44
With substantial control over the flow of offense-related facts to the judge,
and even over the investment of resources in the discovery of facts to begin
with, prosecutors were left with unprecedented sway over sentencing.
Yet even as judges chafed at having their hands tied by a regime that left
line prosecutors free to manipulate sentences, the Justice Department
leadership came to see the regime as a means of regulating those same line
prosecutors. Those decrying the increase in prosecutorial power caused by the
Guidelines project often forget that, particularly in the federal system,
prosecutorial power is not monolithic. And what to judges seemed like a
constraint on their discretion could also be viewed as an effort to constrain
42. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE
L.J. 1420, 1434 (2008); see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1315, 1338-39 (2005) (describing
mechanisms through which prosecutors could exercise discretionary authority).
43. See Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense
System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342, 1359-60 (1997); see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison
Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REv. 235,
244 (2005) (describing relevant conduct rules "designed to ensure that prosecutors did not
manipulate their control of the facts into absolute control over sentencing outcomes");
David Yellen, Just Deserts and Lenient Prosecutors: The Flawed Case for Real-Offense Sentencing,
91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1434, 1435 (1997) (noting that the scheme might "negate undercharging
by prosecutors").
44. Kate Stith, United States v. Mistretta: The Constitution and the Sentencing Guidelines, in
CRMNAL PROCEDURE STORMS 455, 472 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
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prosecutors, with the judges involuntarily enlisted as monitors on behalf of
prosecutorial hierarchs in service of centralization of executive power.
4
1
Herein lay the promise of the Guidelines as an executive management tool:
with the inflexibility of the scheme would come a degree of "legibility"
46
hitherto unimaginable in the system. Perhaps now an interested observer-be
she a supervisor, legislator, or member of the public- would be able to tell how
much of a "bargain" a plea deal was. To be sure, as seems inevitable in all such
top-down legibility projects, 47 the data demanded and presumably generated
by the Guidelines would not capture all the local knowledge of the courtroom
"workgroup. ''48 And if all the members of the group -judge, prosecutor, and
defense counsel - colluded to give a defendant an inordinately deep discount,
the record might not reveal it. But collusion might become rarer over time.
Having had their own hands tied, judges might not be so ready to help
renegade prosecutors circumvent the system. The scheme thus seemed to offer
a new degree of transparency and perhaps even a metric for assessing
negotiated dispositions. Even if the outsider could not necessarily assess the
justification for the discount-since, for instance, the constitutionality of a
stop, search, or confession could have been contestable-she could at least
recognize it as one.
Kate Stith adeptly tells how, from the start, the Justice Department became
a cosponsor of the Sentencing Guideline project, in service of some mix of
executive and legislative goals. Attorney General Thornburgh was quite clear in
demanding adherence in the field to both the letter and the spirit of the
Sentencing Guidelines. In keeping with her management style, Attorney
General Reno allowed the districts and line prosecutors somewhat more
discretion.49 The change from Reno to Ashcroft was particularly dramatic. One
is hard pressed to figure out the degree to which the sentencing policies of the
Bush (II) Administration followed from its commitment to hierarchical
45. See Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEx. L. REV. 2055,
2055-57 (2006); Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, The Use and Transformation of Formal
Decision-Making Criteria: Sentencing Guidelines, Organizational Contexts, and Case Processing
Strategies, 45 Soc. PROBS. 248, 262-65 (1998) (discussing how state sentencing guidelines
can be used by a district attorney's office as a management tool).
46. JAMES C. ScoTr, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES To IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998) (exploring measurement, mapping, and other devices
deployed by states to make activities and relationships more "legible," and thus more
amenable to control). I thank Peter Schuck for directing me to Scott's work.
47. Id. at 44.
48. See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINAL COURTS 20 (1991).
49. Stith, supra note 42, at 1441.
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control. Perhaps the arrow went in the other direction, with commitment to
sentencing uniformity sparking increased interest in hierarchical control. In
any event, the two projects dovetailed nicely.
Consider the story of the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act of
2003,"° which tightened the appellate standard of review for all departures
from the Sentencing Guidelines, and in particular, called on the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to reduce the incidence of downward departures.
Perhaps because the measure required the DOJ "to take a more aggressive role
in policing guidelines compliance and resisting downward departures 'not
supported by the facts and the law,"''.. the Amendment is generally portrayed
as a legislative initiative, albeit one with considerable DOJ support.5 2
Particularly in hindsight, however, the measure might be better characterized
as a DOJ project in which congressional allies willingly joined. The sponsor,
Congressman Tom Feeney (R-Fla.), appears to have been carrying water for a
drafting group that included Justice Department officials and a former AUSA
working for House Judiciary Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. When that
aide later resigned after improperly using his boss's name in a letter asking that
a drug defendant receive a higher sentence, four senior DOJ officials intervened
to get him hired as an AUSA in the District of Columbia. 3 Here, as on other
5o. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act, Pub. L. No. 1o8-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
51. See Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 749, 789 (20o6) (quoting PROTECT Act § 401(l)(1), 117 Stat. at 674).
52. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial
Power To Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004). But see Frank 0. Bowman,
III, No Time for Judges: With Feeney Amendment, Justice Department Seeks Control of Federal
Sentencing, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at 67 (noting the extent to which Congress was a
cat's paw for the DOJ).
53. See Michael Gerber, Down with Discretion, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 72, 74 ("The
primary author of the Feeney Amendment is Jay Apperson, who worked ... in the Virginia
U.S. attorney's office for a decade before becoming one of Kenneth Starr's deputies in the
independent counsel's office that investigated the Clintons .... As an aide to F. James
Sensenbrenner, the 13-term Republican congressman from Wisconsin who chairs the House
Judiciary Committee, Apperson drafted a bill to reduce judicial discretion and lengthen
sentences. He worked closely with Justice Department lawyers."); Carol D. Leonnig, Hiring
Process Was Bypassed for Prosecutor, WASH. POST, May 8, 2007, at A4 ("When he was counsel
to a House subcommittee in 2005, Jay Apperson resigned after writing a letter to a federal
judge in his boss's name, demanding a tougher sentence for a drug courier .... [But] when
Apperson was looking for a job recently [after working in the interim for a Senate
Republican], four senior Justice Department officials urged Jeffrey A. Taylor, the top federal
prosecutor for the District of Columbia, to hire him. Taylor did, and allowed him to skip the
rigorous vetting process that the vast majority of career federal prosecutors face."); Jeffrey
Rosen, The Court's Fancy Footwork: Breyer Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2005, at lo
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occasions in which the precise executive role has not been obvious, s4
congressional activity ranged somewhere between abdication and
acquiescence."
This is not to suggest that the Feeney Amendment itself was at odds with
demonstrated legislative interests. It was quite consistent with Congress's
commitment to the Guidelines project, with its substantial disregard for the
value of judicial discretion, and with its tradition of providing enforcement
resources to federal prosecutors at the lowest cost (to the fisc, at least).56 After
all, the provision was primarily about judicial discretion, and by limiting
judges' ability to depart from Guidelines calculations that reflected a high
degree of prosecutorial input, it essentially endowed prosecutors with
additional bargaining power that could be flexed for more and speedier
dispositions.
Once one recognizes the Justice Department's role in the Feeney
Amendment, other features of that measure are similarly redolent of the
Department's willful conflation of sentencing and centralization policies.
Consider the provision that conditioned further use of "fast-track" programs -
used in a number of hard-pressed districts to obtain speedy dispositions and
broad waivers, generally in immigration cases, by offering extraordinarily
lenient sentences - on explicit permission from the Attorney General.5 7 Perhaps
the measure was simply an effort to give "legitimacy and legislative support to
(suggesting that the Feeney Amendment was "[1]argely drafted by the Ashcroft Justice
Department").
54. See Doo-Rae Kim, Political Control and Bureaucratic Autonomy Revisited: A Multi-Institutional
Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 33, 34 (2008) (" [E]mpirical
research into regulatory behavior has traditionally underestimated the importance of joint
actions among political principals to an agency.").
55. See Keith E. Whittington & Daniel P. Carpenter, Executive Power in American Institutional
Development, 1 PERSP. POL. 495 (2003) (noting the need for scholars to go beyond models of
legislative abdication and delegation to consider acquiescence).
56. See O'Hear, supra note 51, at 786-9o (discussing the legislative intent behind the Feeney
Amendment); see also Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing
Practices? The Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Feeney Amendment, 2 J. EMPiRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2005).
57. See Albert Llosas Barrueco, Fast-Tracking United States v. Booker: Why Judges Should Not
Fix Fast Track Disparities, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 65, 75 (2006); Evan W. Bolla, An
Unwarranted Disparity: Granting Fast-Track Departures in Non-Fast-Track Districts, 28
CARDOzo L. REv. 895 (20o6); Michael M. O'Hear, Localization and Transparency in
Sentencing: Reflections on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REv. 357 (2004);
Charging, Plea, and Early Disposition Policies Before the U.S. Sent'g Comm'n (2003) (statement
of Paul Charlton, U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
heafings/9_23_03/Charlton.pdf
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an already existing practice. ' ' 8 But it can also be seen as an effort by Main
Justice to prevent U.S. Attorneys' offices from responding to local conditions
or drifting away from departmental priorities -an effort that would essentially
recruit sentencing judges as monitors in service of top-down regulation.
So too with the Ashcroft Memorandum, promulgated six months after the
passage of the Feeney Amendment. In it, the Attorney General enjoined all
federal prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable
offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case, except as
authorized by an Assistant Attorney General, United States Attorney, or
designated supervisory attorney" in certain limited circumstances.5 9 Moreover,
"if readily provable facts are relevant to calculations under the Sentencing
Guidelines, the prosecutor must disclose them to the court," because
prosecutors could not "'fact bargain,' or be party to any plea agreement that
results in the sentencing court having less than a full understanding of all
readily provable facts. ' '6' The Memorandum can be seen as a laudable effort to
even-handedly constrain prosecutors to the same extent as judges, binding
both actors to the available facts and the Guidelines calculations that flow from
them.61 But it also fit nicely with departmental efforts to reduce consideration
of local realities in the districts.
Even the now infamous provision in the 20o6 USA PATRIOT Act
reauthorization that changed the procedures for the appointment of interim
U.S. Attorneys62 may have reflected parallel sentencing and political control
goals, as well as utter congressional acquiescence in an executive project. The
measure certainly strengthened the hands of the Attorney General and the
White House in firing and replacing U.S. Attorneys. Previously, if the new
U.S. Attorney whom the Attorney General had picked to fill a vacancy had not
been confirmed by the Senate within 120 days, the district court could appoint
someone else. The new legislation "repeal[ed] the authority of the court and
58. Barrueco, supra note 57, at 75.
Sq. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo3/September/o3-ag-516.htm.
60. Id.
61. See Bibas, supra note 52, at 301-02 ("[T]he many critics of Ashcroft's new restrictions on plea
bargaining fail to see how they actually improve the balance of power. By limiting charge
bargaining, he is limiting line prosecutors' arbitrariness and partially offsetting the Feeney
Amendment's lopsidedness.").
62. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2oo5, Pub. L. No. lO9-177, § 502,
120 Stat. 192, 246 (20o6) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 546 (2000)). The provision has since been
amended via the Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, Pub. L. 11o-
34, § 2, 121 Stat. 224 (2007).
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permit[ted] the Attorney General's temporary designee to serve until the
vacancy [had been] filled by confirmation and appointment."6 Yet according
to Daniel Collins, for whom the move to allow interim U.S. Attorneys to stay
in their posts indefinitely was a pet project while at the Justice Department, it
was judicial anger at the Feeney Amendment that led him to push for
eliminating judges from the interim appointments process.64  The
Department's then-congressional liaison, William Moschella, got a staffer on
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Brett Tolman, to slip the provision into the
USA PATRIOT Act reauthorization. Tolman thereafter was appointed U.S.
Attorney for Utah.6s
So how does one determine what role centralization goals have played in
the Department's sentencing policies? Institutional mind-reading is always a
challenge. Sometimes one can work backwards and presume intentionality
from the natural result of a program. But this line of reasoning does not go far
when dealing with measures that no informed observer would expect to be
very successful. Any theoretical model would predict that the informational
66costs on this hierarchical control project would be prohibitive. And a
practitioner would agree. As Frank Bowman has noted: "the experience of the
63. BRIAN T. YEH & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., USA PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT
AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 49 (updated Dec. 21, 2oo6),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf.
64. See Chitra Ragavan, Change in Naming Interim U.S. Attorneys Was Benign, Former Justice
Official Says, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 12, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
news/articles/o70412/12gonzales.htm.
65. See id.; see also E-mail Correspondence Between William Moschella, Brett Tolman & Daniel
Collins (assorted dates), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Media/pdfs/dag199o-
2o62.pdf (DOJ document set three).
66. See John T. Scholz, Jim Twombly & Barbara Headrick, Street-Level Political Controls over
Federal Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 829, 847 (1991) (finding, based on a study of
county-level enforcement activities of the federal Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, that "[t]he inevitable discretion of street-level bureaucrats occurs even in
enforcement agencies, despite the volumes of regulations that govern their behavior and
sophisticated management information systems that monitor their activities"). The
management control problems faced by the Justice Department would not be surprising to
anyone familiar with large bureaucracies. See Martin Landau & Russell Stout, Jr., To Manage
Is Not To Control: Or the Folly of Type II Errors, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 148, 152 (1979) ("The
history of American bureaucracy instructs us that efforts to 'impose' control and 'force'
compliance lead to disaster."); Paul A. Sabatier, John Loomis & Catherine McCarthy,
Hierarchical Controls, Professional Norms, Local Constituencies, and Budget Maximization: An
Analysis of U.S. Forest Service Planning Decisions, 39 AM. J. POL. ScI. 204, 207 (1995) ("[T]op
officials have less control over 'street-level bureaucrats' than the Progressives envisioned...
particularly when field officials are professionals whose job commitment is contingent upon
their ability to exercise substantial discretion." (internal citations omitted)).
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last decade, during which variants of the same policy [regarding charging and
accepting pleas to only the most serious provable offense] have always been in
place, strongly suggests that the Justice Department cannot meaningfully
restrain local United States Attorney's Offices from adopting locally convenient
plea bargaining practices.,
67
The best evidence of the challenges to top-down management comes from
federal death penalty cases, where the Department's commitment to national
uniformity long predates the Ashcroft Memorandum. A very large proportion
of homicides in the United States, including those committed in connection
with drug trafficking, racketeering, civil rights offenses, and even some
robberies, can potentially be charged federally with a death sentence sought.
Yet comparatively few are. Since 1988, when the federal death penalty was
reinstated, the Attorney General has authorized its use against only 435
defendants.68 Until 1994, the Attorney General would not consider a case
unless a U.S. Attorney's office had decided that the death penalty would be
appropriate. Thereafter, in an effort to ensure greater uniformity in
administration, the federal protocol was revised to require that federal
prosecutors submit for review by the Attorney General all cases in which the
death penalty could have been sought based on the federal offenses being
charged, regardless of whether the U.S. Attorney wished to seek that penalty.
69
Attorney General Reno also directed a study of demographic and geographic
differences in the 682 such "death-eligible" cases that had been submitted by
U.S. Attorneys' offices for review between January 1995 and July 2000.70 Upon
finding ethnic minorities overrepresented in these 682 cases, Attorney General
Reno went one step further and directed that the universe of inquiry be
expanded to include cases in which a death-eligible charge would have been
factually supportable but had not been brought. Attorney General Ashcroft,
67. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing
After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 193; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The
Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 113-14 (2005).
68. See Dick Burr, David Bruck & Kevin McNally, Fed. Death Penalty Res. Counsel Project, An
Overview of the Federal Death Penalty Process (Apr. 1, 20o8), http://capdefnet.org/fdprc/
contents/shared files/docs/i-overview of fed death-process.asp. Determining the
appropriate denominator to use for this numerator is, as will be seen, a daunting question.
69." See STEPHEN P. KLEIN, RICHARD A. BERK & LAURA J. HICKMAN, RAND CORP., RACE AND THE
DECISION To SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY IN FEDERAL CASES 3 (20o6); Rory K. Little, The
Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice's Role, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 406-40 (1999).
70. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY
1988-2000 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/_dp-survey-final.pdf
(looking only at death-eligible cases).
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who had assumed the leadership of the Department in the interim, issued a
report on the cases in this expanded universe, and directed that efforts be made
to assess how this universe was constructed.7'
The problem is that the truly relevant universe -that of homicide cases that
could be pursued federally but usually are not-is not so amenable to study and
regulation. The best a recent qualitative study commissioned by the Justice
Department could do was to draw on "the analogy of a window that is cracked
open (or slammed shut) to let in homicide cases. '72 It further observed that
"the degree to which the window to federal involvement is open depends on
two conditions: openness of both local and federal authorities to potential
federal involvement and interaction and coordination between them." z3
Emphasizing the extent to which local authorities played a gatekeeping role,
the study noted: "One city adamantly refused federal assistance with homicides
or local crimes in general, while a neighboring city had learned to use federal
assistance and capabilities as an integral part of both law enforcement and
prosecutorial practices."'74
Under Attorneys General Ashcroft and Gonzales, the Justice Department's
quest for strict horizontal equity and "uniformity" in capital cases was
accompanied by a readiness to overrule local decision making75-a readiness
that may have contributed to the firing of several of the U.S. Attorneys.76
There is, however, an essential incoherence in the notion of "uniformity" when
the universe of potential federal cases has never been prespecified, and when
decisions to put homicide cases on the federal radar screen are so idiosyncratic.
It is not altogether meaningless to command that a subordinate treat like cases
alike, yet give her untrammeled discretion about what becomes a "case." But it
comes close.
71. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA,
ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW (2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm.
72. PHYLLIS J. NEWTON, CANDACE M. JOHNSON & TIMOTHY M. MULCAHY, NAT'L OPINION
RESEARCH GROUP, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF HOMICIDE CASES IN THE U.S.: THE
PROCESS FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 40 (20o6), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffdesl/
nij/grants/214753.pdf.
73. Id. at 41.
74. Id. at 43.
75. For a critique, see John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney
General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1697 (2003).
76. See Jost, supra note 16; Richard A. Serrano, Tom Hamburger & Ralph Vartabedian, At
Justice, Life-and-Death Frictions, LA. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2007, at Alo.
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The Justice Department's Guidelines project represented an effort to scale
up this quixotic quest for uniformity from capital cases to all cases. The level of
monitoring would be far lower outside the capital context. But the intense
focus on what made it onto the federal radar screen, and concomitant disregard
for what never did was the same. Indeed, the project's chance of success might
be underestimated by those who do not consider how organizational cultures
can change. Life-tenured judges had, over time and through self-selection,
become increasingly inured to the way the Guidelines and mandatory
minimums cut to the heart of what their predecessors saw as the judge's role.'
Surely it was not far-fetched to expect that hierarchically-controlled line
prosecutors with far shorter tenures would soon begin thinking that cases came
into the office with sentences attached to them, at least where the prosecutor
did little to develop the cases herself.
Then came Booker, which struck at the core of the uniformity project by
relieving sentencing judges of the obligation to adhere to the Guidelines.
In the immediate aftermath of Booker, the DOJ's chief stratagem was to
pretend nothing had happened. A memo to all federal prosecutors enjoined
them to "take all steps necessary to ensure adherence to the sentencing
guidelines.", 8 The Department's position led one district judge to complain
that "the executive branch [was] continuing to campaign for ... a supposedly
scientific equation of justice, without mentioning the wholly unscientific and
overwhelming discretion it exercises over the sums that equation produces.
79
He went on to chide "the executive" for wanting "to be prosecutor and judge"
and for "arbitrarily claim[ing] that any sum lesser than what it contrives is
unreasonable and contrary to law." 8O In an apparent response to this sort of
resistance, and to the post-Booker legal uncertainty, Attorney General Gonzales
77. See Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of
Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231 (2004); David M. Zlotnick, Republican Appointees
and Judicial Discretion: Case Studies from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Era (June
2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.rwu.edu/dzlotnick/OSI-Report-
june2007.pdf
78. Memorandum from Deputy Att'y Gen. James B. Comey to All Federal Prosecutors (Jan. 28,
2005), available at http://sentencing.typepad.conVsentencing-law anLpolicy/fles/dag-jan
28comey-memo-onjbooker.pdf; see also Laurie P. Cohen, Justice Department Is Pressuring
Judges on Sentencing Guidelines, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2005, at A4.
79. United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding a guidelines
sentence inappropriate in part because of the disparity between crack and powder cocaine
sentences), vacated, 456 F.3d 1353 (1ith Cir. 2006).
80. Id.
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went further and proposed turning the Guidelines into mandatory
minimums.s1
The change of party control in Congress and the flap over the U.S.
Attorney firings have taken a toll on the Department's efforts, however. The
Department's principal legislative goal these days is to avoid the retroactive
application of the new crack cocaine guidelines.82 Any plans for undoing Booker
have at least been put in abeyance. With a likely lull on the legislative and
executive sides, this is a good time to reassess the project.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE DOJ'S GUIDELINES PROJECT
Regardless of its motives, the Justice Department's effort to promote rigid
"compliance" with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines -to the degree it had any
effect at all-would reinforce the most problematic features of the federal
criminal enforcement system: its minimal political accountability and the
related absence of adequate performance measures.8"
81. See Att'y Gen. Alberto Gonzales, Sentencing Guidelines Speech (June 21, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2ooS/o62l2oo5victimsofcrime.htm (noting that
loss of"mandatory guidelines system ... threatens the progress we have made in ensuring
tough and fair sentences for federal offenders"); see also David M. Zlotnick, The Future of
Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning Lessons from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines
Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 16 (2008) (describing the Justice Department's reaction to
Booker); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales
Announces Expansion of Justice Department Efforts and Proposes New Legislation To Help
Prevent and Combat Violent Crime (June 1, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo7/June/o7_ag-398.html (proposing the Violent Crime
and Anti-Terrorism Act of 2007).
82. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/finalamendo7.pdf (amending § 2D1 and making the new
Guidelines retroactive); U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO § 1B1.io REDUCTION IN
TERM OF IMPRISONMENT AS A RESULT OF AMENDED GUIDELINE RANGE (2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/o303o8rf.pdf. It is worth noting that even as Attorney
General Mukasey voiced opposition to the retroactivity provision, some U.S. Attorneys'
offices had already consented to retroactive application in several cases. See Richard B.
Schmitt, Confusion Arises over Crack Cases, Mukasey and Some U.S Attorneys Are Not on the
Same Page, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008, at A14; see also United States v. Herndon, No.
3:oCRooo63, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22277, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2008)
(complaining that the U.S. Attorney's "blanket objection in all cases" in which a sentence
reduction based on the retroactivity provision was being considered "does not assist the
court in making [a particularized determination], and, in fact hinders it").
83. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 609 (suggesting that the "two central truths of
federal criminal law enforcement" are "a very small sphere of responsibility coupled with a
very large sphere ofjurisdiction").
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As Kate Stith has written, the notion of consistency is illusory even when it
comes to judicial decisionmaking across federal districts. s But at least the
informational universe for assessing judges is a closed one. Not so for
prosecutors, who play a leading role in the construction of this universe. In
theory, federal enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and the Drug Enforcement Administration,
could play a significant role in ensuring consistency. Given that federal cases
are generally a function of team production involving prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies, it might be enough for Washington to monitor and
regulate how cases get presented for prosecution.8' Yet in large swathes of the
federal docket, the extent to which federal enforcement authority has been
leveraged or outsourced through task forces, deputization, or other formal or
informal mechanisms of collaboration with the local police 6 means that the
ties of agency field offices to local authorities have become particularly close-
and at the expense of centralized control.
Is the reliance of U.S. Attorneys' offices on local informational networks
and their close connection to the local politico-legal community a "bug" or a
"feature" of the federal enforcement system? The question is relative because
the very nature of a criminal justice project, which relies on localized
investments in information gathering, and the very nature of the American
adjudicatory process 87 which relies on local juries applying local norms, would
engender connections to the local community irrespective of bureaucratic
structure. Yet in the federal context-where the local prosecutors lack the
political and legal independence that most district attorneys have in state
systems - the relationship between the districts and the center is open to
manipulation at the margins and is worth considering as a normative matter.
The "bug" position is implicit in many analyses of the federal enforcement
bureaucracy and in the DOJ Guidelines project itself. And there is something to
84. See Stith, supra note 42, notes 99-1oo and accompanying text.
85. See Richman, supra note 8, at 8o8-o9 (drawing on team production literature to understand
relationships between prosecutors and law enforcement agents).
86. See MALCOLM RUSSELL-EINHORN, SHAWN WARD & AMY SEEHERMAN, FEDERAL-LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT COLLABORATION IN INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING URBAN CRIME, 1982-
1999: DRUGS, WEAPONS, AND GANGS (2000); see also Richman, supra note 32, at 394-407
(pre-9/11 dynamic); id. at 4o8-15 (post-9/ll dynamic).
87. See Mirjan Dama~ka, Structures ofAuthority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J.
480,511-15 (1975).
88. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717,
750 (1996) (discussing the lack of hierarchical authority that most state attorneys general
have over local prosecutors); Richman, supra note 45, at 2o64 (same).
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be said for it. History is hardly a source of confidence in the suitability of the
Department's structure. With offices created at a time of minimal federal
criminal enforcement activity, 89 the U.S. Attorneys were not put under the
supervision of the Attorney General until 1861,90 and the Justice Department
was not created until 1870. The next hundred years saw the commitment of
federal enforcement resources to a variety of new areas, with Congress and
Presidents increasingly ready to target white slavers, bootleggers, highway
gangsters, and big-city racketeers. 9 ' But the federal portfolio remained small -
and activity within that portfolio spotty. The exception to all this was, of
course, Prohibition, when the U.S. Attorney system faced its first extended
challenge, with state and local enforcers perfectly happy to leave unpopular
enforcement to federal authorities. 92 During this period, by all accounts,
8g. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 435, 1 Stat. 73, 93 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(2000)); DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829, at 13 (1985); Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of
American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996);
see also STEPHEN MIHM, A NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS: CAPITALISTS, CON MEN AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (2007) (suggesting that Jeffersonian Republicans'
distrust of centralized authority "may account for why the federal government did so little to
prevent, prosecute, or punish counterfeiting of any sort in the years after 18oo").
go. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, "The U.S. Attorneys Scandal" and the Allocation of
Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming May 2008) (manuscript at lo, on file
with The Yale Law Journal); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and The Democracy:
Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 2008)
(manuscript at 13-14, on file with The Yale Law Journal); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering
American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1289-91
(2006) (describing the status of the Attorney General at the time of the Founding).
gi. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes 4 (Nov. 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
92. See Lincoln C. Andrews, Prohibition Enforcement as a Phase of Federal Versus State Jurisdiction
in American Life, 129 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 77 (1927) (complaining, as
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in charge of Prohibition, about the failure of state and
local authorities to enforce Prohibition); Louis B. Boudin, The Place of the Anti-Racketeering
Act in Our Constitutional-Legal System, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 273-74 (1943) (describing how
state and local authorities left Prohibition enforcement to the federal authorities); Robert
Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State:
Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2006); Albert E. Sawyer, The
Enforcement of National Prohibition, 163 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 11 (1932)
("[W]ith the steady enlargement of Federal police jurisdiction, culminating in the
Eighteenth Amendment, has come the necessity for concerted action on the part of [the]
heretofore entirely independent groups in the enforcement of a single law."). The story
before Prohibition is one of challenges that were regrettably not faced, like civil rights
enforcement after Reconstruction, see ROBERT J. KACZoRoWSKI, THE POLITCS OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CVIL RIGHTS, 1866-
1876 (1985); Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of
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dysfunction reigned. Forced to scale up their operations and perhaps not
sharing Washington's commitment to the project, U.S. Attorneys' offices
compromised cases at fire-sale prices. 93
Scale was not the only source of institutional tension within the
Department during Prohibition, however. One vignette from New York City in
1928 highlights the organic disjunction between local and national offices on
issues of enforcement priorities, and in particular the way a U.S. Attorney's
office's ties to local elites can moderate its commitment to a national program.
During the quiet days of late August 1928, while U.S. Attorney Charles Tuttle
was out of town, a special assistant reporting to Mabel Walker Willebrandt,
the redoubtable Assistant Attorney General in charge of Prohibition
enforcement, had grand jury subpoenas served on 125 "society leaders, bankers,
police and prohibition agents said to have been patrons of twenty-six night
clubs raided recently by the Federal dry forces. '" 4 Immediately upon hearing of
this conspicuous shift to a demand-side strategy, Tuttle shut down the inquiry,
declaring: "As long as I am United States Attorney here,... citizens will not be
called in wholesale lots in this way. I am here to protect the citizenry of New
York."95 By the next day, Willebrandt had responded, insisting that Tuttle had
known of the subpoenas. She declared, "Nothing will be allowed to handicap
the Government's investigation."96  The inquiry went forward under
Willebrandt's direction, with Tuttle and his staff notably absent from the
grand jury room. The New York Times observed, "It is believed here that a
serious departmental situation would result if Mr. Tuttle should intervene in
any way with the Grand Jury investigation. Heretofore, in controversies
between Mrs. Willebrandt and United States Attorneys, the former has almost
invariably been sustained." 97 A year later, however, the Times reported, "Mr.
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TULANE L. REv. 2113, 2133-66 (1993), and that did not
substantially materialize- like sabotage and treason during the First World War.
93. See John F. Padgett, Plea Bargaining and Prohibition in the Federal Courts, 19o8-1934, 24 LAw
& SOC'Y REV. 413 (1990); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REy. 79, 127 (2005) ("Apparently, in the liquor cases,
federal prosecutors had to offer larger concessions in their recommended sentences before
defendants would give up their valuable trial rights."); see also Edward Rubin, A Statistical
Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, i LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 494, 497 tbl.i (1934)
(finding that in 1930, roughly sixty-five percent of the 87,305 federal criminal cases were for
Prohibition violations).
94. Tuttle Halts Drive on Clubs'Patrons; Scores Dry Tactics, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1928, at i.
9s. Id.
96. Mrs. Willebrandt Insists Tuttle Knew of Club Subpoenas, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1928, at i.
97. Willebrandt Aide Pushes Dry Inquiry in Spite of Tuttle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1928, at 1, 1O.
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Tuttle won out, and the grand jury ended this phase of its work," a victory that
Mrs. Willebrandt later attributed to Tuttle's "political ambitions." gs
Following repeal, the federal prosecutorial establishment was able to return
to its vagarious pursuits, with the "agenda" (a charitable description) reflecting
enforcement agencies seeking to boost their statistics99 or status;"' the
preferences of local U.S. Attorneys, and the occasional administration
initiative.' °' In 1976, a public administration scholar, having spent a year
working in the Justice Department, concluded that "the federal justice system
acts peculiarly as if it were a non-system."' °2 He observed that "despite their
apparent interdependence with each other- investigative, enforcement,
prosecutorial, judicial, corrections, and parole segments of federal justice- the
structured pressures of decentralized decision making allows [sic] for
enormous independence and disparities among these Justice units.""0 3
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw a dramatic expansion of the
federal enforcement establishment and its ostensible responsibilities,
particularly in the areas of white collar crime, narcotics, and violent crime.
Perhaps the decentralization of the federal system itself facilitated this growth.
This possibility seems particularly likely in the local corruption area where
innovative prosecutorial theories-only later sanctioned by congressional
action°4 -arose out of district experimentation in an enforcement space in
98. Tuttle Newcomer to Political Fray, N.Y. TMEs, Sept. 27, 193o, at 4. U.S. Attorney Tuttle soon
ran for governor of New York as an "outspokenly wet Republican" candidate against
incumbent Democrat Franklin Roosevelt. MICHAEL A. LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN:
PROHIBITION IN NEwYORK CITY 295 (2007).
99. EISENSTEIN, supra note 12, at lO6 tbl.6.2 (1978) (showing that Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2311-13
(1970), prosecutions constituted between a sixth and an eighth of all federal prosecutions
between 1964 and 1970); Richman & Suntz, supra note 14, at 614; Richard J. Stillman, II,
The Bureaucracy Problem at DOJ, 36 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 429, 429 (1976) (noting "[p]ressure
on FBI offices around the country 'to make their statistics look good"'); see also JAMES Q
WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 172 (1978) (noting
how FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover touted Dyer Act (interstate car theft) statistics).
loo. See Kathleen J. Frydl, Kidnapping and State Development in the United States, 20 STUD. IN AM.
POL. DEv. 18, 20-44 (20o6) (assessing J. Edgar Hoover's "institutional transformation"
achievements at the FBI during the 1930s).
1m. See generally EISENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 76-1oo (describing the dynamics of interaction
between Washington and U.S. Attorneys).
1o2. Stillman, supra note 99, at 429.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 666 (2000) (federal program bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000)
(intangible rights deprivation as a basis for federal mail and wire fraud prosecutions); see
also Richman & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 617.
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which local norm-generation offered some insurance against federal
overreaching.05
Yet given that this scale-up was not accompanied by any significant change
in the Justice Department's structure, it is entirely possible that the present
path-dependent U.S. Attorney scheme is just not "fit for purpose," as the Brits
are wont to say. The more that can be done to rein in these appendages, the
argument goes, the better, particularly with respect to case selection and plea
bargaining." 6 To expand on Frank Bowman's "sticker price" metaphor, 1°7 one
might see Washington facing all the problems endemic to a far-flung vertical
distribution chain with franchisees that cannot be trusted to report and develop
demand. After all, federal sentences are effectively the price at which federal
prosecutors "sell" convictions. And resale price maintenance -which is one way
of characterizing the Ashcroft Memorandum and the promotion of Guidelines
"compliance"- might be one way of protecting the "quality" of federal
prosecutions. By monitoring the kinds of cases brought by the districts and
preventing line prosecutors from offering discounts, Washington can ensure
that prosecutors, forced to demand full price from defendants, will invest more
in making the cases. 'Os In this elegant, albeit surreal, model, defense lawyers
are effectively recruited as quality monitors of prosecutorial efforts, as a
prosecution will either lead to a full-price sentence or an acquittal.
Another argument for maximal control from Washington was cogently
made by Dan Kahan when he noted the risk of "prosecutorial overreaching"
inherent in the U.S. Attorney system and the benefits that the reallocation of
ios. See Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government's Authority To Prosecute
Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions and a Proposal,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2000); Michael W. Carey, Larry R. Ellis & Joseph F. Savage, Jr.,
Federal Prosecution of State and Local Public Officials: The Obstacles to Punishing Breaches of the
Public Trust and a Proposal for Reform (pt. 1), 94 W. VA. L. REV. 301 (1991-92); Charles F.C.
Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement
Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1977).
1o6. For an argument along these lines, see Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call for a
Directive, Goal-Oriented Principle To Guide the Exercise of Discretion by Federal Prosecutors, 39
VAL. U. L. REv. 625 (2005).
107. See Only Suckers Pay the Sticker Price: The Effect of "Fast Track" Programs on the Future of the
Sentencing Guidelines as a Principled Sentencing System: Hearing Before the U.S. Sent'g Comm'n
(Sept. 23, 2003) (statement of Frank 0. Bowman, III, M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law,
Indiana University School of Law), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/9_23-03/
fbowman.pdf.
io8. See Benjamin F. Blair & Tracy R. Lewis, Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric Information
and Moral Hazard, 25 RAND J. ECON. 284 (1994) (discussing joint-profit-maximizing retail
contracts where the manufacturer can observe neither the level of service supplied by dealer
nor the state of demand).
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"lawmaking authority" to Main Justice would offer: "Distant and largely
invisible bureaucrats within the Justice Department lack the incentives that
individual U.S. Attorneys have to bend the law to serve purely local interests,"
and "the Department is more likely than are U.S. Attorneys to internalize the
social costs of bad readings."' 9 Although Kahan made these points in the
context of giving Washington greater control over how federal criminal
statutes are interpreted, concerns about suboptimal U.S. Attorney drift might
easily extend beyond statutory interpretation to federal prosecutorial discretion
more generally. While U.S. Attorneys have some connection to local or
national elected officials, the fact remains that only the President has direct
political accountability for federal prosecutorial decision making, and the more
taut the lines of control to his Attorney General and in turn to departmental
supervisory minions, the better.
But how does this political accountability actually work? On paper, the
scheme is clear: "Our democratically elected representatives have decided to
enact uniform national criminal laws to address national problems and enforce
them with one voice through one agency- the U.S. Department of Justice.""'
And the democratically elected President, generally through his Attorney
General but perhaps directly, is charged with "taking care" that this occurs. '
Yet even if one accepts these general propositions in support of broad
centralized authority - and not everyone does" 2 - one still needs to confront the
fundamental truth about the current federal enforcement system: it is not a
system at all, but in large part just an adjunct to state or, more often, local
criminal justice systems."1
3
log. Kahan, supra note 17, at 497.
11o. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140
(2005).
ill. See Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 25, at 539.
112. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003) (arguing that the "presidential control"
model does not adequately protect against the arbitrary decisionmaking that would
delegitimate agency action); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2080 (2005) (noting the "highly attenuated
nature of electoral accountability"); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696 (2007).
113. See Daniel Richman, Response, Judging Untried Cases, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUtMBRA 219,
222 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/issues/articles/154-1/Richman.pdf; see also Lisa L.
Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in
Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 239 (2005); Gerard E. Lynch, Letting
Guidelines Be Guidelines (and Judges Be Judges), OSCJL AMiCI: ViEws FROM THE FIELD (Jan.
20o8), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Aricles-i/Lynch-final-12-28-07.pdf.
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Consider the current federal criminal docket. In fiscal year 2006, drug
trafficking defendants comprised 34.6% of those receiving federal sentences
(25,086 defendants out of a total 72,518), and firearm cases constituted another
11.6% (8384 defendants)."14 Most of the narcotics defendants were not
international drug traffickers. A sampling of drug cases in 2005 found that
76.5% of the crack cases were "neighborhood" or "local," as were 25.8% of the
powder cases. This already reflected a shift on the powder side from street-level
dealing to wholesaling between 20oo and 2005. 1 s The prevalence of firearms
cases reflects the Bush Administration's (and before it, the Clinton
Administration's) commitment to street violence programs coordinated with
local police departments., 6 As for the 1J66 robbery defendants who comprised
1.6% of all federally sentenced offenders in 20o6, a review of the reported cases
leaves one hard pressed to figure out what is essentially "federal" about the
robberies that are pursued by AUSAs." 7 Moreover, any effort to separate out
what would otherwise be indistinguishable "local" cases from obviously
"federal" cases is likely to undercount the former. What, for example, is one to
make of the 1293 (1.8% of the 72,518 federally sentenced offenders)
pornography/prostitution defendants, the 1714 (2.4%) larceny defendants, or
even the 6958 (9.6%) fraud defendants, since "[w]hat constitutes a major
114. See 2006 U.S. SENT'G COMM'N ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oo6/table3.pdf; see also 20o6 U.S. ATtrORNEYS' ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 14 (20o6), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/readingroov
reports/asr20o6/o6statrpt.pdf (showing that all drug crimes, including possession and
trafficking, constituted 26.2% of federal criminal cases filed in FY20o6, and violent crime
constituted 18.6%).
115. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/rscongress/cocaine2007.pdf; see also
United States v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (noting how the DEA
and the Osceola County Sheriff's office, "[aipparently frustrated with the state's lenient
treatment" of the defendant, "for many years, a petty drug dealer," arranged for an
undercover agent to buy crack from him), vacated, 456 F. 3d 1353 (iith Cir. 20o6).
116. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, PSN IN PRACTICE 11 (2OO6), available at
http://www.psn.gov/pubs/pdf/PSNInPracticell.pdf; Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended
Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming
Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2002); Richman, supra note 22, at 379-85; Richman,
supra note 32, at 396-98.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220 (2d Cit. 2007) (robbery for drugs and drug
proceeds); United States v. Jimenez-Torres, 435 F.3 d 3 (1st Cit. 2006) (home invasion,
robbery, and murder of a gas station owner); United States v. Turner, 272 F.3d 380, 384-85
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fraud in one district may not be a big deal in another" ?118 That there are no
certainties in this regard reflects another fundamental truth about current
enforcement realities: no citizen or scholar has a good idea of exactly what
federal enforcement resources are deployed and to what end."9
The story of how we came to this point has been extensively told
elsewhere 2' and is frequently followed by a normative analysis of why the
extension of federal enforcement activity into areas of traditional local concern
is an abuse of Commerce Clause authority, an affront to federalism, and a
source of unnecessary jurisdictional conflict. No such normative claims are
made here. Recognizing that a large chunk of federal enforcement activity is
simply aid-in-kind to localities, for which federal elected officials are often
eager to take credit,' ought to be the beginning, not the end, of the analysis.
After all, criminal charges can be as much an information-gathering tool as a
deterrence and incapacitation mechanism. In the absence of frictionless
institutional coordination across jurisdictions or even across agencies, even
quintessentially "federal" investigations into large-scale interstate or
international criminal enterprises will often take root from ostensibly "local
crime" prosecutions. Moreover, to the extent that federal prosecutors are
targeting street crime in and of itself, one might still see the value of using
federal enforcers as a "strategic reserve"' 2 against local bad guys. In any case,
pork is in the eye of the beholder.' 3
The point-here, at least-is not that federal prosecutors ought to avoid
bringing these otherwise local cases, but rather that the idea of consistency and
uniformity across these cases nationwide is an odd one." 4 The defendants are
118. Voreacos & Van Voris, supra note 31 (quoting Leslie Caldwell, former head of the Enron
Task Force); see U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl. 3 (2oo6), available at http://sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2oo7/
Apr2oo7/documento3.pdf.
iig. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 14, at 613-15.
12o. See Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement,
in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: BOUNDARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 81
(Charles M. Friel ed., 2000); Richman, supra note 32, at 382-407.
121. Richman, supra note 12, at 786; Richman, supra note 32, at 401-02.
122. Richman, supra note 22, at 405.
123. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A
Generalization, 25 AM. J. POL. SCL 96 (1981).
124. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing After Booker and Rita, 8s
DENY. U. L. REV. 79, 91 (2007) ("Anyone interested in balancing consistency with
individualized sentencing ought to acknowledge that the task is harder for the Federal
Government than for a State, and ought to keep that in mind each time someone proposes
federalizing a new area of crime.").
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indistinguishable from those sentenced in the local courts, which themselves
are governed by state schemes with their own peculiar local disparities. The
selection process that puts these defendants in federal court may be a matter of
happenstance (e.g., the victim called the feds rather than the locals),
idiosyncratic coordination between federal and local authorities, or random
dipping by federal officials into the inexhaustible local pool.12 And the futile
efforts of Washington to supervise the federal death penalty26 -where the
number of cases is lower, the stakes higher, and the political will likely
greater-should leave no doubt about Washington's inability to monitor the
selection process of these noncapital cases across districts.
It is troubling enough when, in the face of this inability, Washington
grades districts by the number of cases they bring. The Main Justice
apparatchiks who tried to identify "underperforming" districts based on the
number of federal gun prosecutions 1 7 may have simply sought to ensure that
one of several federal enforcement priorities was pursued with adequate zeal
nationwide. But the availability of an easily satisfied performance metric -there
will often be, after all, an inexhaustible supply of gun cases-will skew a
compliant manager's attention away from those aspects of his job less
amenable to quantification128 And for U.S. Attorneys interested in hitting the
numbers, that would mean diminished attention to the kinds of investigations
for which numerical targets are less likely to be set, like complex fraud and
corruption cases.
12s. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1159 (1995) (discussing then-U.S. Attorney Giuliani's "federal day"
program); see also United States v. Cherer, 513 F.3 d 1150, 1163 (9th Cir. 2oo8) (Noonan, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("The paucity of [sexual offense cases in Sentencing
Commission database] is accounted for by the limited number of places under federal
jurisdiction where sex crimes could occur.").
126. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
127. See Memorandum from John S. Irving, Counsel to Deputy Attorney Gen., to Paul McNulty,
Deputy Attorney Gen. 22 (Mar. 6, 20o6), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
Printshop.aspx?Section=411 (DOJ document set eight) ("While prosecution statistics alone
were never meant to be the sole measure of district performance, they have evolved into a
benchmark. This is in part because prosecution numbers have been increasing at such
astronomical rates that they have been convenient tools to illustrate the Department's PSN
efforts.").
128. See Avinash Dixit, Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review, 37
J. HuM. REsOURcEs 696, 722 (2002) ("Most incentives schemes are designed to focus on the
few dimensions thought of by the policymaker. But the agents respond by changing their
activities in all dimensions, and the effects on the other dimensions affect some other
principals or stakeholders adversely.").
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To require national consistency, however quixotically; in how these
fungible local cases are handled once brought is simply to increase the level of
dysfunction. 2 9 While as offenders, the defendants in these cases might be
indistinguishable from those prosecuted in state court, their selection (for
whatever reason) for federal "treatment" places them within the ambit of a
boutique system in which calls for toughness are loud and the sounds of real
people faint. It is hard enough to assess the efforts of the federal government in
such clear priority areas as counterterrorism and corporate fraud. How can one
possibly expect political accountability to hold sway when it comes to street
crime? In this realm, neither federal legislators nor enforcers will be held
responsible for the crime rate. Those offenders who are prosecuted federally
can be made politically valuable examples by a jurisdiction that lacks the
budgetary pressures faced by state and local authorities. 3° Indeed, because
federal sentences are essentially a variant of local pork, the tendency of federal
legislators seeking to benefit their districts will be to "overspend.''. And these
defendants will seem so much more menacing than the nonviolent offenders
who populate most of the federal docket.
Viewed from this perspective, the extent to which U.S. Attorneys' offices
are embedded in the local legal-political economy is a source of needed
modulation, not regrettable disparity. U.S. Attorneys' offices have their own
reasons to push for maximal sentencing. This, after all, is how they get their
leverage to obtain cooperation or quick guilty pleas from defendants. But they
are also subject to balancing factors like local exigencies, the interests of local
enforcement officials, community preferences (which might be expressed in
judge and jury receptivity), and the immediate availability of local criminal
justice systems as reference points.'32 If one is looking for accountability in the
kinds of cases discussed here, it is far better to embrace the derivative
accountability that arises out of the network of connections a U.S. Attorney's
office has to its district than the ostensibly direct accountability that runs from
129. See Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 25, 61 (2005) ("Something might even be said for reasonable variations
among methodologies and/or outcomes by federalizing federalism, viewing individual
circuits and even districts as pseudo-states within the federal system.").
130. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 8o6-12 (2005) (comparing
criminal justice budget pressure on states to that faced by federal authorities).
131. See Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public
Goods: A Political Economy Approach, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 2611 (2003).
132. See Gleeson, supra note 75, at 1714 ("[I]f the U.S. Attorney and federal law enforcement
agencies determine that law enforcement needs in the district require the diversion of
resources to particular cases or investigations, offering favorable plea bargains to avoid time-
consuming trials of unrelated cases is an entirely acceptable means of doing so.").
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a U.S. Attorney through the Attorney General to the President. It is only this
network of district connections that will hold a U.S. Attorney's office's feet to
the fire in any meaningful way that goes beyond case counting.
Dan Kahan was surely right to suggest that Main Justice will do better than
the scattered U.S. Attorneys' offices at internalizing the costs of prosecution
theories that can chill viable economic conduct and even, perhaps, political
expression. But when it comes to the prosecution of street crime, low-level
drug crime, and so much of the other "local" crime that finds its way into U.S.
Attorneys' offices, the federal deterrence message and the real nature of federal
responsibility are likely to be noise swallowed up by local enforcement choices.
Practically speaking, the only performance metric will be within the contours of
the case brought, and there almost always will be a conviction, probably on a
guilty plea, because of the resources the feds can bring to bear and the
discounts offered to those who so plead or cooperate against others. Federal
officials will be happy to take some credit for helping (a lovely, vague word) to
reduce the crime rate when it is falling, but there will be no large-scale
internalization of the costs of a few high sentences. Those most aggrieved-the
unlucky defendants and, to a lesser degree, the federal courts133-will be hard
pressed to shift the costs they bear.
Need the choice between district variation and top-down control be so
stark in this area? Perhaps not, at least to the extent that one envisions a new
governance model unfolding across the federal enforcement bureaucracy, with
Washington fostering experimentation in the districts and promoting the "best
practices1134 that will put local knowledge in the service of broad, national
goals. But this cannot happen without agreed upon and determinable
performance metrics, something we have never had in the federal criminal
133. See Richman, supra note 32, at 402-04 (discussing burdens placed on the federal judiciary
and the response to them).
134. See Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831 (2000) (arguing that drug treatment courts are a
harbinger of open and evolving experimentalist institutions); Daniel Richman, Decisions
About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REv.
295, 327 (2008); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1015 (2004) (describing the transition from top-
down, fixed rule bureaucracy to an experimentalist approach); William H. Simon, After
Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1453, 1469-70 (2006) ("Prosecutors should articulate standards for the exercise of
discretion, measure their own performance under the standards, provide transparent
procedures for revising the standards in the light of experience, and provide remedies for
targets that believe they have been harmed by violations of the standards.").
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justice system, particularly with respect to street crime. 3 ' Even to the extent
that a crime drop can be fairly attributed to an enforcement program,' 36
questions will remain about the federal role in that program- questions for
which the responsive information will be controlled and generated by local
authorities, particularly the ones who benefit from the federal intervention.'37
At any rate, no one would accuse the Ashcroft Department of experimentalist
tendencies. And had its top-down effort to curb sentencing flexibility in the
districts been successful, the policy would have driven discretion down to the
intake level-the least transparent part of the adjudicative process-in those
cases where the exercise of enforcement discretion is most in need of
regulation.
Where there is some structural integrity to the federal "beat"-put
differendy, where federal responsibility for pursuing criminal activity is clear
and where discretionary decision making by an AUSA is not the sole origin of a
case's designation as "federal" -the arguments for centralized management are
far stronger. Here is where, for better or worse, Washington is more likely to
bear the costs of enforcement decisions across districts since one can at least
conceive of performance metrics based on something other than adjudicative
success. These will, not coincidentally, also be cases in which the diffuse
benefits engendered by the enforcement program of which they are a part have
led to either the explicit reservation of prosecuting authority to the federal
government or to a simple lack of interest or capacity on the part of state and
135. See Daniel Richman, Institutional Competence and Organizational Prosecutions, 93 VA. L. REv.
IN BRIEF 115 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p
=20o7/o6/18/richman.
136. See also Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons:
Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMvwRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223 (2007);
Philip J. Cook, Assessing Urban Crime and Its Control: An Overview 15-19 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,781, 2008) (reviewing efforts to evaluate policing
programs), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w3781; cf. Richman, supra note 32, at
400-01 (noting the debate about the role that federal COPS funding played in the national
crime drop). Compare Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The
Case of Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECrS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 251 (Jens
Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (finding that Project Exile had little or no effect on
Richmond's homicide rate), with Richard Rosenfeld, Robert Fornango & Eric Baumer, Did
Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 419, 436-38
(2005) (finding a decline in crime in Richmond after Project Exile).
137-. See Rubin, supra note 112, at 2126-29 (discussing a superior's choice between procedural and
substantive accountability standards, and noting the pitfalls of each). For discussion of DOJ
accountability efforts in Project Safe Neighborhoods, see Edmund F. McGarrell, Strategic
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local authorities. Conversely, the federal government may bring special
competences to the program, because of its ability to invest resources
selectively, its transnational range, and its unique ability to coordinate
nationwide activity-all competences that rely to some extent on centralized
control.
Interestingly enough, in immigration, the largest category of cases 3 in
which federal responsibility is clear, even the Ashcroft and Gonzales Justice
Departments were not averse to interdistrict variation. In those high-volume
districts in which U.S. Attorneys' offices had to act like local prosecutors-with
possible performance metrics and an indefeasible political obligation to pursue
cases- the rigors of the Ashcroft Memorandum and the ostensible allegiance to
national uniformity soon gave way to "fast-track" programs that offered deep
discounts to defendants willing to enter quick guilty pleas.139 Put differently,
where AUSAs exercised less discretion on case intake, they were allowed more
discretion in case disposition. To be sure, even as it pushed districts to bring
immigration prosecutions, 40 the Justice Department retained control over
licenses for such programs, since no district could invoke this rubric as a basis
for sentencing departures in the absence of explicit Justice Department
authorization.1 4' But the history of "fast-track" immigration programs suggests
that where the federal system has some structural integrity (i.e., clear
responsibility), we can expect a degree of responsiveness to local conditions
across districts.
Where does this leave white collar crime? When we think in terms of
institutional design, should it be treated more like violent crime or more like
138. 2006 U.S. ATrORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTIcAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 14.
139. See United States v. Mejia, 461 F.3d 158, 16o-6i (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that fast-track
programs are a permissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Charging, Plea and Early
Disposition Policies: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Sept. 23, 2003) (statement of
Paul Charlton, U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona) (stating that "fast track" programs
are reserved for "exceptional circumstances, such as where the resources of a district would
otherwise be significantly strained by a persistently large volume of a particular category of
cases, or where state or local prosecution is unavailable or unlikely"); see also Barrueco, supra
note 57; Bibas, supra note iio, at 148 (describing congressional control of fast-track
programs); Bowman, supra note 42, at 1339 n.113 (discussing the creation of fast-track
programs).
140. See Memorandum from Daniel Friedman, Counsel to the Deputy Attorney Gen., to Paul
McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen. (May 26, 20o6), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
Printshop.aspx?Section=411 (DOJ document sets 11-4 to 11-5).
141. By August 2006, fast-track authority had been given to, among other districts, the District
of Kansas for "fraudulent document use to gain employment." See Memorandum from Paul
McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Various U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 3, 20o6), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/Printshop.aspx ?Section=411 (DOJ document set twenty-seven).
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immigration? The answer turns on the degree to which there is a coherent
federal program cutting across districts with ascertainable responsibilities and
spillover effects. That some nonviolent malfeasance can be charged as mail or
wire fraud certainly does not mark it as identifiably "federal." '42 Yet there is a
strong argument for consistent cross-district federal white collar enforcement
of some prespecified (or at least conceptually clear) classes of cases in support
of a national deterrence model.
Federal income tax evasion cases are one obvious class of such cases. 143
Others might include accounting fraud in publicly traded companies, insider
trading in the shares of such companies, and other similarly unsurprising
categories of offenses with clear national market implications. Were interested
observers - legislators, corporate executives, and others - to have a sense of the
federal project in this area, accountability and deterrence might well be
promoted through national consistency in sentencing. Such uniformity would
also have a salutary tendency to remove venue selection incentives from the
government when it decides whether, say, a corporate fraud case should be
brought in the district where the corporate headquarters is located or in the one
where the bulk of the employees who lost their jobs as a result of the fraud live
and work. Is it possible that efforts to reduce inter-district variation in this area
would lead to inappropriately high sentences for certain white collar
defendants, particularly those with the temerity not to either cooperate or at
least plead guilty with alacrity?"4 Perhaps. The analysis here provides no direct
answer to those troubled by the sentence given to Jamie Olis. 4 But the
142. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private
Distinction, 35 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 427 (1998); Richman & Stuntz, supra note 91, at 7.
143. See United States v. Cutler, No. 05-2516, 2008 WL 706633 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 20o8). In the
course of reversing a below-guideline sentence on the government's appeal in a bank fraud
and tax evasion case, the panel quoted Sentencing Commission commentary: "Recognition
that the sentence for a criminal tax case will be commensurate with the gravity of the offense
should act as a deterrent to would-be violators." Id. at *26 (quoting the introductory
comment to chapter 2, Part T of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
144. See Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 721, 737 (2005).
145. Olis, a mid-level executive at Dynegy, initially received a sentence of more than twenty-four
years after going to trial in an accounting fraud case. Id. at 727-28; see also United States v.
Olis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (reversing Olis's sentencing); Kathleen F. Brickey, In
Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 96 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (2006);
Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28 CARDozo L. REv.
1611, 1629-30 (2007); cf. Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP.
L. 27 (2008) (discussing the claim that corporate law has been "overcriminalized"). Olis
eventually received a non-Guidelines sentence of six years' imprisonment. United States v.
Olis, Crim. No. H-o3-217-Ol, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68281 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006).
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systemic goal should be to have federal corporate crime enforcement and
sentencing reflect legitimate assessments by politically responsible officials
about the threats posed by corporate fraud. 14 6 And it is inevitable that, in the
absence of a long-term consensus on the matter, there will be under- and
overreactions. The concerns expressed by the recent "Interim Report of the
Committee On Capital Market Regulation"'47 that federal public enforcement
activity might drive market activity overseas may bear reassessment in light of
the role that under-regulation may have played in the current credit crisis.
4 s
Yet the notion that centralized federal actors ought to and are the best placed to
set the level and nature of prosecutorial activity in this sensitive policy area
seems right.
It should be clear by now that my measured embrace of decentralization in
federal criminal enforcement is historically contingent and politically
contestable: to the extent the DOJ were to comnmit itself to some national
outcome measure that went beyond cases brought and dispositions obtained, a
considerable degree of centralized control would make sense. It certainly made
sense for the Secret Service and the Treasury Department to preside from
Washington over the treatment of counterfeiting during the critical decades
following the creation of a national currency and the establishment of the
Secret Service. 49 And although any effective domestic intelligence network will
inevitably have to rely on state and local authorities for information gathering
and dissemination (and will therefore need to be sensitive to the concerns of
146. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing
Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines
Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373 (2004); Buell, supra note 145, at 1612
("In a federal system of policing and punishing financial fraud, concerns include that
uncoordinated actions of multiple sanctioning authorities could lead to over-sanctioning of
fraud, resulting in over-deterrence and unjust punishment. Additionally, lack of
coordination could lead to discord and confusion in the expressive effects of punishing
white-collar crime. These concerns cannot be addressed in the absence of rough consensus
across jurisdictions, around a focal point in law, about scale and methodology for measuring
and aligning a given group of cases eligible for punishment.").
147. INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMrIrEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (Nov. 30, 20o6),
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/ll.3oCommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf;
see also Jenny Anderson, Sharply Divided Reactions to Report on U.S. Markets, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2006, at C8.
148. See Edmund L. Andrews & Stephen Labaton, Split Is Forming over Regulation of Wall Street,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at I (noting political debate "over how to strengthen oversight of
financial institutions after decades of deregulation"); Elizabeth Williamson, Political
Pendulum Swings Toward Stricter Regulation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 20o8, at 1.
149. See MuiM, supra note 89, at 340-74 (recounting efforts of the Secret Service to protect
federal currency after the introduction of greenbacks in 1861).
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the periphery),' ° the diffuse benefits flowing from counterterrorism
prosecutions and the clear federal responsibility for them counsels a high
degree of centralized control, or at least supervision. But in a world in which,
even after the 9/11 attacks and the consequent prioritization of
counterterrorism programs, street crime and other ordinary "local" criminal
activity occupies such a large part of the federal criminal docket, the likely
demise of DOJ's Guidelines Project ought not be regretted.
IV. THE PROMISE OF THE FUTURE
To what extent can we expect the Supreme Court's latest sentencing
cases-Rita, Kimbrough, and Gall-to assist in an appropriate recalibration of
the allocation of power between Washington and the districts, and between
U.S. Attorneys' offices and other district actors?
Predictions are a challenge in this area. After all, the response of sentencing
judges to the discretionary license offered by Booker has been rather measured.
Of the 63,841 defendants sentenced between October 1, 2006, and September
30, 2007, 61% received sentences "within guideline range," according to the
Sentencing Commission's most recent report-a figure that becomes
impressive when combined with the 25.7% who received "government
sponsored below range sentences," generally because of cooperation or fast-
track disposition.'' The effective "compliance" rate nationwide is thus 86.7%,
with considerable inter-district and inter-circuit variation on the degree to
which judges "comply" by sentencing defendants within the range specified by
the Sentencing Guidelines. To be sure, the whole notion of "compliance" is
dubious: the judge whose fact-finding is heavily influenced by her desire to
give a defendant an inordinately high or low sentence will be "compliant" so
long as she thereafter invokes the standard Guideline provisions; the judge
who follows Booker and, after calculating the Guidelines sentence, carefully
works through the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) is not. Nor is the judge who
departs upward or downward based on a factor that even before Booker would
have been easily accepted by an appellate court as a ground for departure.
Moreover, certain institutional dynamics will continue to favor "compliance" -
as a matter of form, at least -particularly when it comes to downward
departures. More and more judges have become accustomed to the
150. See Richman, supra note 32, at 422-26.
151. U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER RELEASE
1 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sc-cases/QuarterReport-4th-07.pdf.
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Guidelines.' 2 If the government is at all strategic in the downward departures
that it appeals, the appellate docket will still be dominated by cases in which
the sentencing judge might well have acted "unreasonably."
Yet the data so far may be a function of a number of factors likely to change
in the near future. In a number of circuits, the strict appellate review given to
non-Guidelines sentences can be expected to change in light of Gall and
Kimbrough."' After all, the Kimbrough Court noted that "as a general matter,
'courts may vary' [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy
considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines."' 4  Such
language from the Supreme Court recently led a Fifth Circuit panel to observe
in the course of affirming an upward departure, that the "argument that a
disagreement with the Guidelines is not a sufficient reason to impose a non-
Guidelines sentence has lost most of its force."'55
The reviewing hand may lighten even in circuits that have not been so
strict., 6 Consider United States v. Cavera, where a Brooklyn district judge had
sentenced a gun trafficking defendant with a recommended Guidelines range
of twelve to eighteen months to a substantially higher non-Guidelines sentence
of twenty-four months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release. 
1 7
Noting that New York state law would have given the defendant and his co-
defendant a "substantially more severe sentence than that called for by the
Guidelines," Judge Charles P. Sifton observed that the "disparity created by
imposing a longer sentence for firearms trafficking into large metropolitan
152. Indeed, an impressive level of "compliance" might have been obtained even had the
Guidelines been advisory from the start. See John F. Pfaff, The Continued Validity of
Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L.
Rrv. 235 (2006) (presenting state data suggesting that voluntary guidelines can reduce
sentencing variation).
153. For a helpful survey of the recent cases, see Memorandum from Jennifer Coffin to Nat'l Fed.
Defender Sentencing Res. Counsel (Jan. 16, 2oo8), available at http://www.fd.org/pdflib/
case%2oreview/o2opost%ogall kimbrough%20 i16_o8.pdf; see also United States v. Carry,
No. 05-10200, 2008 WL 763770 (9 th Cir. Mar. 24, 2008); United States v. Williams, 517
F.3 d 8ol (5 th Cir. 2008).
154. 128 S. Ct. 558, 570 (2007) (citing Brief for United States at 16, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No.
06-633) (alteration in original)).
155. United States v. Herrera-Garduno, No. 07-40327, 2008 WL 625010 (sth Cir. Mar. 10, 2008).
156. Only 50.6% of sentences in the Second Circuit are "within Guidelines range." See U.S.
SENT'G COMM'N, supra note 151, at 2.
157. United States v. Lucania, 379 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Sifton, J.), rev'd sub nom.,
United States v. Cavera, 505 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit is considering
Cavera en banc. Twelve years earlier, Judge Sifton had expressed his views on local variation
in Charles P. Sifton, Theme and Variations: The Relationship Between National Sentencing
Standards and Local Conditions, 5 FED. SENT'G RPTR. 303 (1993).
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areas such as New York City is at least as well justified as the disparity created
by ... fast-track programs. ",s Indeed, he noted, the rationale for fast-track
programs - "the limited resources that certain judicial districts have in relation
to their overwhelming caseloads"-"is an 'extra legal' consideration only
arguably related to the purposes of criminal sentencing. 1 9 In contrast, the
imposition of "[1]engthier sentences based on an increased likelihood of harm
in a given locality ... is tied to the congressionally authorized purposes of
sentencing contained in § 3553(a) such as providing adequate deterrence and
reflecting the seriousness of the offense."
6 °
On appeal, a Second Circuit panel reversed. Rejecting the district court's
effort to draw support for the consideration of local conditions from the law
relating to fast-track programs, the panel noted in its 2007 decision: "While
fast-track programs forsake uniformity to obtain other benefits, congressional
participation ensures that other goals of the SRA, including transparency, are
preserved." 6, It concluded that the individualized sentencing allowed by
Booker "does not authorize a district court to inject into sentencing decisions its
policy preferences with respect to the category of offense in question or the
kind of community in which it is perpetrated. ,
1
62
Less than two months later, Kimbrough came down. There, a district judge,
faced with a defendant convicted for trafficking in crack cocaine, had found
that the guidelines-specified range of 228 to 270 months would have been
"greater than necessary" to accomplish the purposes of sentences set forth by
the Sentencing Reform Act. 63 The court noted that the case "exemplified the
'disproportionate and unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in
sentencing, ' '" 6 4 since, had the defendant been accountable for the same amount
of powder cocaine (cocaine hydrochloride), his Guideline range would have
been 97 to io6 months. In fact, the Guidelines, following the lead set by
Congress in statutory provisions, generally "treated every gram of crack cocaine
158. Lucania, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 296, 297.
159. Id.
16o. Id.
161. Cavera, 505 F.3d at 222. It seems odd for the court to focus on congressional participation
when Congress's involvement was limited to delegating power to the Attorney General to
license fast-track programs.
162. Id. at 225; see also United States v. Cavera, No. 05-4591, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 13003, at *25
(2d Cir. June 6, 2007) (Calabresi, J., concurring dubitante), opinion withdrawn by, substituted
opinion, 505 F.3d 216 (2007).
163. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 565 (2007).
164. Id.
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as the equivalent of loo grams of powder cocaine."' 6s Bound by the statutory
mandatory minimum provision to give 18o months, the district court gave that
and no more. 66 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that a
reduction of sentence on these grounds was "per se unreasonable.' 67
At oral argument in the Supreme Court, commenting on the possibility
raised by Justice Alito that one sentencing judge in a crack case might use a
one-to-one ratio; another judge, twenty-to-one; the next, fifty-to-one; the
next, eighty-to-one; and the next, one hundred-to-one,' 68 Justice Breyer
suggested that it would "be the end of the Guidelines" if "every judge has his
own view of policy and there is a vast range. ''' 6' But when the case was
decided, the only safeguards that the Kimbrough opinion itself offered against
such policy fragmentation were snips of catechism from Booker: "Advisory
Guidelines combined with appellate review for reasonableness and ongoing
revision of the Guidelines in response to sentencing practices will help to 'avoid
excessive sentencing disparities." '17° Perhaps when it decides the case en banc
(oral argument was held on March 27, 2008), the Second Circuit will not
explicitly repudiate Cavera in light of Kimbrough and Gall. But it should, since
the "policy preferences" that the Cavera panel barred a sentencing judge from
injecting into its sentencing decisions cannot persuasively be distinguished
from those that the Supreme Court subsequently freed sentencing judges to
consider in Kimbrough.
Cavera was the product of a peculiar juxtaposition-a sentencing judge
feeling liberated by Booker to consider local criminal justice norms and a U.S.
Attorney's office bound by the Justice Department's mandate that prosecutors
adhere to the Guidelines and maintain a studious disregard for such local
circumstances. To what extent will such pairings continue to occur? The
answer will in part come from district judges, who in the wake of Kimbrough
and Gall may well play a larger role in the district enforcement ecology. Some
judges will push the envelope. Thus, even before those decisions came down,
Judge Jack B. Weinstein relied on Booker and invoked state enforcement norms
when a drug addict defendant, on supervised release from a federal murder
conspiracy conviction, was charged with violating his release terms after several
165. Id. at 567.
166. Id. at 565.
167. Id.
168. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558 (No. 06-6330).
169. Id. at 14.
170. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 573-74 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2004)).
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state drug possession arrests.'7 ' The New York State system, he noted, has
drug treatment courts designed to divert offenders with drug addictions away
from incarceration; the federal system lacks such a program. When considering
"the impact of sentencing on specific and general deterrence and on reducing
recidivism rates," he reasoned, "state-vertical coordination is more important
than national-horizontal uniformity.' 72 Moreover, taking account of "the
disparity between state and federal sentences" would also address "the concern
that the federal courts are overwhelmed with matters that can and should be
tried in the states."'73 And it would "moderate the power of prosecutors to
whipsaw defendants -federal prosecutors intervening in state matters, and
state prosecutors threatening deferral to federal prosecutions with the prospect
of higher sentences."' 74 On these grounds, Judge Weinstein "deferred," to state
authorities and adjourned the federal proceeding for a year.' 7 While Judge
Weinstein did not stand alone in his readiness to consider "vertical" disparities
between federal and state sentencing practices in a particular locality,'176 his
remained the minority position when Gall and Kimbrough were decided.' 77 It
remains to be seen whether circuit law will change in their wake.
Yet the unresolved and probably more significant variable will be the
positions that U.S. Attorneys' offices take and the freedom that the Justice
Department explicitly gives them.178 The extent to which U.S. Attorneys'
offices assist and even spearhead the movement of district judges into the legal
space created by Gall and Kimbrough may end up being a function of how
discretionary authority is generally allocated between the districts and the
171. United States v. Brennan, 468 F. Supp. 2d 4 00 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
172. Id. at 407.
173. Id. at 406 (quoting Christine DeMaso, Note, Advisory Sentencing and the Federalization of
Crime: Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the Disparity Between State and Federal
Sentences Under Booker?, 1o6 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2128 (2006)).
174. 468 F. Supp. 2d at 407-08.
175. Id. at 402. Although the precise legal basis for this "deference" is somewhat unclear, it does
not appear that the government has appealed Judge Weinstein's decision.
176. See United States v. Wilkerson, 411 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (remanding a case where the
district judge expressed concern about disparate state and federal sentences but stated that
the Guidelines barred consideration of that fact).
177. See United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases).
178. Those, like Doug Berman and a Harvard Law Review commentator who understandably
bemoan circuit adherence to guidelines even after Rita, might welcome the encouragement
and substantive contributions that prosecutors might bring to sentencing law development.
See Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 DENV. U. L.
REv. 7, 19 (2007); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 245,
252 (2007).
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center in the new administration. What "lessons" about the virtues of district
independence, if any, will be drawn from the Bush Administration's travails
remain to be seen. But there are strong arguments for the authorized
collaboration of U.S. Attorneys' offices with sentencing judges and appellate
courts in the development of district-specific sentencing policy. One argument
simply rests on institutional competence. With all due respect to Judge Sifton
in Cavera and Judge Weinstein in Williams, district judge enforcement
policymaking is bound to be less informed than it would be with prosecutorial
input. So long as they do not use "national uniformity" as a substitute for
nuanced analysis, prosecutors can also illuminate the effects of particular
enforcement and sentencing policies outside of the district.
A second argument rests on necessity: the collaboration is bound to happen
anyway, and, in many cases, the issue is only whether prosecutorial input
comes in the form of winks and nods or explicit policy articulation. Absent
large-scale institutional change, line prosecutors will play a dominant role in
the construction of the sentencing information universe, and their priorities
and preferences will inevitably shape what is before a court. To this extent,
they too may be beneficiaries of the advisory regime confirmed by Gall and
Kimbrough, regardless of what authorization they have from their executive
superiors.
A principled argument for explicit collaboration between district judges
and district prosecutors in the development of district-specific sentencing
norms can also be made-one that draws on the pathologies179 of the federal
enforcement "system" discussed above.Is Balance in a criminal justice system
will inevitably be elusive when legislators or distant bureaucrats hurl
sentencing numbers at crimes that are well worthy of their condemnation but
for which they take scarcely any responsibility."' Moreover, even were federal
"uniformity" obtainable in the prosecution of such crimes, it would depend on
179. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, loo MICH. L. REv. 505 (2001); see
also William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming June 2008).
18o. Given how U.S. Attorneys' independence from Washington serves congressional purposes,
see Richman, supra note 12, the Supreme Court's sentencing cases may be likened to
administrative law cases in which the Court, according to Lisa Schultz Bressman, "might see
its role as mediating the needs of both political branches for control of agency
decisionmaking, consistent with separation of powers." Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As
Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1753 (2007).
181. For a nice example of federal sentencing numbers being thrown at a street crime problem,
one need look no further than the story of the crack penalties. See David A. Sklansky,
Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1296 (1995) (describing how the
crack-cocaine ratio jumped from the 20:1 ratio proposed by the Reagan Administration to
the oo:1 ratio proposed by the Senate Democratic leadership).
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willful blindness to the world that exists behind the odd subclass of offenders
caught in the federal beam. Let us, then, embrace rather then bewail the
organic roots of U.S. Attorneys' offices in the districts they serve, and see
district courts as transparent sites for the development of sentencing norms
that have some meaning beyond statistics maintained in Washington.
What would the world look like were Washington's fetters removed and
line prosecutors explicitly licensed to join the rest of the courtroom working
group in articulating sentencing norms? Even were the circuits to relax the
virtually per se prohibition on the ad hoc consideration of local enforcement
conditions, one would not expect prosecutors, as a starting matter, to seek or
acquiesce in parity with state sentences-at least where those sentences are
lower, as they usually are. The predictable sting of federal sentences may be the
most potent information-gathering tool in the prosecutorial arsenal. And even
in cases in which this leverage is not needed, a district has a strong incentive to
protect the federal "brand" (its reputational capital among repeat-player
defense lawyers) for use in cases where it is needed. Over time, however, where
local sentences present ready comparators to judges and defense lawyers, the
high Guideline sentences will no longer be so predictable, and prosecutors,
having lost some of that advantage, might well see offsetting benefits in
sentencing flexibility, which might allow them to handle more local cases. Or
perhaps fewer, since in the absence of a clear federal sentencing premium, the
federal forum might be less alluring for local enforcers. One need not spin out
more hypothetical scenarios to see that each district and perhaps even each
district judge will reach its own equilibrium, which will be a function of local
conditions, bargaining strategies, and the ease with which resources flow
between institutions (state and local, local and federal, prosecutors and police).
At the very least, prosecutors will find it much harder to hide behind the
Guidelines when defending their decisions to federal and local agencies, judges,
defense lawyers, and perhaps even the public.
Once locally focused federal enforcement activity is better grounded in the
local criminal enforcement ecology, it is entirely possible that the in-kind
contribution represented by federal adjudication and sentencing will be of less
interest to local enforcers and of less use to federal officials. This would not be
a bad thing, as it might recommit U.S. Attorneys' offices to enforcement
programs with more diffused benefits and help give the federal enforcement
bureaucracy a clarity of mission that it has lacked for some time. This clarity of
mission would also make the Justice Department's political leadership far more
accountable. And it would give the Department a far stronger justification for
seeking sentencing "uniformity" across districts than it has had up to now.
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CONCLUSION
What criminal enforcement concerns are "national" and which are merely
"local"? The question has dogged courts and commentators since the Founding
and has received renewed judicial attention since United States v. Lopez."2 Few
would claim that the Supreme Court (or the lower courts) have had marked
success since Lopez in drawing such lines as a constitutional matter.'
Moreover, even to the extent lines could be drawn, deference to the political
branches would require that the federal realm be defined expansively, with the
inevitable inclusion of many offenses of the sort generally pursued by local
enforcement authorities and for which the locals will be held responsible
politically.
That courts can play only a limited role in patrolling federal criminal
jurisdiction as a statutory or constitutional matter, however, does not mean
that they cannot contribute significantly to making federal authorities more
accountable for their enforcement choices. And the federal courts have been
given a significant tool to make such a contribution by the Supreme Court's
recent sentencing cases, which have freed judges to consider the interaction of
federal and local criminal justice norms when imposing sentences. U.S.
Attorneys' Offices-which have a long history of mediating between national
priorities and local needs and norms-are perfectly suited to collaborate with
sentencing judges in this institutional negotiation of what is "really" federal.
The extent to which they will be permitted to play this role and how
transparently they will play it will depend on how much Washington has
learned from recent experience, and particularly from 2007, the year of the
periphery.
182. 514 U.S. 549, 557 (199S) (stating that the "scope of the interstate commerce power" should
not be allowed to "effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government" (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937))); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a
Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REv. 849 (1999).
183. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9
LEwIs & CLARK L. REv. 823 (2005).
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